Often in Greece we interpret political developments with myths and labels, perhaps because it is easier to explain them. The way in which a significant portion of the Greek people understands the popular uprising in Turkey is one such case.
One of the myths about Turkey that is collapsing lately is that of Erdogan. For years the Greek media was saturated by dithyrambic comments in favor of the reformist Prime Minister of Turkey. His conflict with the military establishment was interpreted by many as a democratic revolution and the neo-Ottoman transformation was characterized as a “political changeover”, with obvious reference to the regime changes in Greece or Franco’s Spain.
Many of those who sugar-coated Erdogan’s achievements are now trying to find their place in Taksim square.
The dead end which our neighbors found themselves in was not clear to us on this side of the Aegean. In reality the dilemma in Turkey is between two absolutist positions: political Islam – even in its moderate form, as originally introduced decades ago by Erdogan’s predecessor Erbakan, and nationalistic militarism, as supported by Kemalists and the army.
The main difference between the two for the West was that Erdogan was a receptive listener, despite his focus on the East.
Contemporary Turkey has never had a democracy where its institutions work properly. The attempts in the 1960s and 1970s to establish a Western, urbanized Democracy were short-lived and failed amidst the polarization and armed conflict of the era. To this day Turkey had a very broad interpretation of Democracy. Every coup-plotting army generals will define themselves as Democrats.
Another scarcely-known truth in Greece is that the liberal Turkish Constitution that was composed by the military regime after the coup in 1960 lasted on 20 years. After the 1980 coup from General Evren the relentless persecution of leftists tipped the balance in favor of the Islamists.
At this point one might wonder if there are democratic citizens in Turkey, with the equivalent political sensibilities of the citizens of European countries. The answer is that they obviously exist and that they are many, when considering the population of Turkey. Only they never managed to coalesce and influence authority. Perhaps that is why they remained “purer” regarding their ideological make-up and exhibit and romanticism from a different era, in the eyes of the Greek audience.
Ultimately, the historical background is enough to justify why there is no foundation in drawing parallels from the demonstrations in Taksim and the “Indignados” on Syntagma square, as many have attempted to do through social networks.
Yannis Mandalidis
